

**Executive Summary of the Colombia Hearing**  
**Bogotá, Colombia**  
**8 - 10 February 2006**

*"The Colombian Government has followed the simplistic strategy of its US counterpart, adopting a strategy exclusively based on military action, according to which all Colombians who propose negotiated solutions are considered as allies of terrorism. This totalitarian strategy seems to repeat the strategy of Southern Cone dictators: no neutrality is admissible."*

(Oral testimony by Alvaro Echeverri Uriburu, Dean of the School of Law of the University of Santo Tomás, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

On 8-10 February 2006, the Eminent Jurists Panel, represented by Justice Raúl Zaffaroni, Professor Robert K. Goldman and Professor Stefan Trechsel held its first Hearing in Bogotá, Colombia. The public sessions of the Hearing, held at Santo Tomás University, was co-organised by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the Colombian Commission of Jurists. The Hearing focused on the issue of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the context of Colombia's long-standing internal armed conflict, with a particular emphasis on the impact on human rights and the rule of law of the implementation of the Government's "Democratic Security Policy" since 2002. The Colombian Government was represented at the Hearing by the Vice-Minister of Defence, Jorge Mario Eastman, who described to the Panel the rationale and outcomes of the "Democratic Security Policy". Lawyers, prosecutors, human rights defenders, journalists, trade unionists, internally displaced people and representatives of Afro-descent and indigenous communities intervened during the Hearing. Subsequent to the public sessions, the Panel held private meetings with senior Government representatives and members of the Judiciary.

## **1 The Colombian Context**

The Panel was told that in Colombia the debate about terrorism and counter-terrorism measures did not start after 9/11, but had been going on for more than four decades in the context of an internal armed conflict involving guerrillas, paramilitaries and armed forces. Participants stressed that the measures adopted by the new Administration were linked to the measures adopted by previous Governments during this long-standing conflict.

Participants noted that the two major guerilla groups, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army), were created in the 1960s as armed opposition to the "National Front", which constitutionally excluded the participation of any actor other than the two "traditional" political parties. They have been involved in grave breaches of international law in the past, and today are still considered responsible for serious crimes, including hostages-taking, kidnapping, and attacking civilians. Some speakers also pointed out that the political instability of the past led to the emergence of drug trafficking, with drug cartels also using violence against civilians.

The Panel also learned that during the 1960s, the Government adopted a decree<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Decree 3398/1965 (Article 33), later transformed in a permanent law, law 48/1968.

allowing civilians to be employed by the State to help re-establish “normality” and to create “self-defence” groups, called the paramilitary. Some participants said that the paramilitary established strong ties with drug traffickers and committed extrajudicial killings and mass murders of civilians. In the late 1980s, because they were considered detrimental for the stability of the country, the Government changed its policy and imposed restrictions on their activities, until it finally outlawed them in 1989<sup>2</sup>.

Subsequently, there have been several attempts to demobilise the members of paramilitary groups and reincorporate them into society. Two participants noted that a 2003 decree<sup>3</sup> allowed all paramilitaries to obtain amnesty if they were not subjected to pending judicial procedures. Some speakers saw the “demobilisation process” as giving immunity for human rights violations and legitimising the appropriation of lands obtained through criminal deeds. They added that many paramilitaries did not respect the demobilisation agreements, and continued to spread violence among the civilian population, to commit crimes, to carry weapons and to recruit new members (including children). This decree also closed all possibility of relief for their victims, and created a climate of impunity, they said.

The Panel heard that the two types of outlawed armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries) today form confusing combinations of alliances with drug trafficking forces. Vice-Minister of Defence Jorge Eastman presented both the paramilitary groups and the guerrilla groups as terrorists, to be equally combated by the State security forces.

*“The Colombian political regime can be defined as a “dangerous democracy in danger”. Despite its democratic weaknesses, the regime continues to be governed by the rule of law; it stills maintains important features such as an electoral and civil tradition, judicial independence and stability. Nevertheless, it is a dangerous democracy, because its citizens live under high risk, due to the context of armed violence and conflict. In many occasions (not always) the threats come from the State itself (...). Furthermore, it is a democracy in danger as well, because the legal and political reactions against those threats, instead of diminishing the risks for the population, increase them (...).”*  
(Oral testimony by Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Centre of Studies in Law, Justice and Society, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

## 2 The “Democratic Security Policy”

Since the beginning of the 1960s, successive Colombian governments reacted to the insurgency of the armed guerrilla movements with a policy based on the National Security Doctrine, which was used in the Southern Cone during the dictatorships. This doctrine was a corollary of the Cold War and was based on the idea of destroying the “internal enemy”, a concept that surpassed the guerrilla movement and included any form of political or social dissent. Several participants considered that the National Security Doctrine was not fully abandoned in Colombia after the end of the Cold War, and was still underlying the Government’s approach about terrorism, including the new “Democratic Security Policy”.

The “Democratic Security Policy” was promoted by the Government just after the

<sup>2</sup> Decree 815/1989.

<sup>3</sup> Decree 128/2003.

election of Alvaro Uribe as President in August 2002. Speakers explained that after 11 September 2001, the United States included FARC and ELN on the list of terrorist organisations, which contributed to the reclassification of the internal armed conflict as part of the “global fight against terrorism”.

The Vice-Minister of Defense, on behalf of the Colombian Government, presented to the Panel the successes of the “Democratic Security Policy”, and highlighted that the security and human rights situation had improved since the end of 2002. He insisted that the Government believed terrorism could be beaten without sacrificing human rights, and was guided in its policies by the cooperation of the whole population. He added that there was no armed conflict in Colombia, but acts of terrorism against the civilian population.

An official Government document<sup>4</sup> describes the goals of the “Democratic Security Policy” as consolidating State control over parts of the country held by terrorists, protecting the population, destroying drug trade, improving and maintaining the capability of the military and managing resources more transparently. The Government claims to have achieved some of these goals by, *inter alia*, encouraging the civilian population to cooperate with the authorities, including by being an informer, recruiting “peasant soldiers” in rural areas, demobilising illegal groups, and increasing intelligence and defence capacities.

Participants from civil society regretted that this policy subordinates all public authorities and powers to the Executive, including through a modification of the judicial remedies, to give more leeway to the Executive in its “fight against terrorism.” They added that the measures adopted in this framework led to human rights and humanitarian law violations.

*“The antiterrorist policy that is extensively used in Colombia is nothing more than the institutionalisation of State terrorism to obtain social, territorial and economic control. Although it is true that there is a fight against insurgency, the civilian population has been the most affected by this fight.”*

(Oral testimony by Gloria Suárez, Female Popular Organization, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

*“States’ obligation to ensure compliance with human rights includes the duty to adopt appropriate measures to prevent their violation. (...) Colombia, as a democratic country, has the duty to stop terrorism. And the instrument to reach this goal is the application of the Democratic Security Policy, through its basic pillars of territorial control, protection of the population, a culture of legality and the rule of law. This policy has demonstrated positive results against terrorism and drug-trafficking. This policy gives Colombian public forces the responsibility to fight terrorism while following Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.”*

(Oral testimony by Jorge Eastman, Colombian Vice-Minister of Defense, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

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<sup>4</sup> See Presidency of the Republic and Ministry of National Defense, *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática* (in Spanish), 2003, available at [www.mindefensa.gov.co/dayTemplates/images/seguridad\\_democratica.pdf](http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/dayTemplates/images/seguridad_democratica.pdf) (last accessed on 15 February 2009). A short summary of the policy in English is available at [www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/visita\\_bush/documentos/security.pdf](http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/visita_bush/documentos/security.pdf) (last accessed on 15 February 2009).

## 2.1 Denial of the existence of an internal armed conflict and involvement of the civilian population

Although many participants expressed their views that the military confrontation lasting for more than forty years constituted an internal armed conflict, the official position of the Government, repeated by the Vice-Minister of Defence at the Hearing, is that Colombia faces a terrorist threat and not an internal armed conflict. Participants from civil society explained that this position implies the rejection of the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, and forces the population to be at the service of the military, including through mobilisation. Some speakers added that the civilian population was placed at heightened risk of harm since there was no incentive for the guerrillas to treat both prisoners and non-combatants in conformity with International Humanitarian Law.

The representative of the Colombian Commission of Jurists, Gustavo Gallón, acknowledged that there were terrorist acts occurring in Colombia, but argued that they were not only committed by the guerrillas, but also by State security forces and paramilitary groups.

*“According to the “Democratic Security Policy” formulated by the current Government, there is no armed conflict in Colombia but terrorist attacks perpetrated by guerrilla groups. This view is misguided and leads to disregard of international treaties and norms on human rights and humanitarian law. (...) The Government has promoted the involvement of civil society in the war, failing to recognise the principle of distinction [between civilians and combatants] and generating political persecution against those who manifest their opposition.”*

(Oral testimony by Gloria Florez, Alternative Social Promotion Association, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

*“The definition of armed conflict could lead to an interpretation that in Colombia there is a civil war between two armed groups, one exercising power and another one intending to seize it with support of the population for ethical, religious or historical reasons. This is not what happens in Colombia where there are simply terrorist groups that threaten the civil population and the Government. The fact that International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law norms are applicable does not imply that we should qualify the situation as an internal armed conflict, but as a terrorist threat against the population and against the democratic institutions.”*

(Oral testimony by Jorge Eastman, Colombian Vice-Minister of Defense, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

Several participants explained how the Government had taken a number of measures to involve the civilian population.

First, the Government has established a “civilian informer network”, composed of civilians who are paid to cooperate with intelligence activities of security agencies of the State, most of them being demobilised paramilitaries or guerrillas. Concerns were expressed that informants might sometimes use their powers in order to pursue personal revenge.

Secondly, it has recruited “peasant soldiers”<sup>5</sup>. This programme consists in training

<sup>5</sup> “Peasant soldiers” are described as “support soldiers” in the official document on the democratic

civilians from rural areas during very short periods of time to serve as part-time soldiers in their own villages, as a way to increase the military presence in all municipalities. The Panel heard that when “peasant soldiers” have been threatened and attacked by insurgents, their lack of training and experience led to several of them being killed or kidnapped.

The Panel heard serious concerns about the recruitment to these programmes, which is in principle voluntary. It was argued that in practice, many members had been forced to join out of fear of reprisals, after being pressured by the security forces. Moreover, concerns were raised about the fact that both informants and “peasant soldiers” carry their own weapons and sometimes accompany the armed forces in military operations, contributing to increase in the level of violence in the country.

*“The informant gives a piece of information. This information is transformed into an intelligence report, which is immediately communicated to the Prosecutor. On the sole basis of this document and despite legislation prohibiting considering intelligence as proof, the Prosecutor orders the deprivation of liberty of the person mentioned by the informant.”*  
(Oral testimony by David Martínez, Colombia – Europe – United States Coordination, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

## 2.2 Extended powers of the armed forces

As shown in the official document about the “Democratic Security Policy”, participants explained that the Government prioritised a military solution to the existing conflict, giving the military wide powers to be able to “combat” terrorism.

Some participants explained that a few days after coming into power, President Álvaro Uribe declared a state of emergency (*estado de conmoción interior*) on the basis of article 213 of the Constitution and issued Decree 2002 of 2002<sup>6</sup>, which established special security zones (*zonas de rehabilitación y consolidación*) and granted the military the power to arrest and detain individuals, intercept or record communications and search private homes without judicial control on the entire Colombian territory. Participants observed that the articles of Decree 2002 granting judicial powers to the military were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, but the Government immediately promoted a constitutional reform (Legislative Act 2 of 2003) to undermine this ruling. Speakers explained that, despite a second ruling of the Constitutional Court in August 2004, declaring the 2003 Act unconstitutional, the military continued to exercise powers ordinarily accorded to the judicial police in practice.

*“Antiterrorist measures allowed judicial faculties to be conferred on the military, their intervention in criminal procedures, the strengthening of the military jurisdiction in human rights violations cases, the investigation and judging of civilians by the military jurisdiction and the location of Prosecutor Offices in military and State security facilities.”*  
Reinaldo Villalba, Bar Association “José Alvear Restrepo”

## 2.3 Interferences with the Judiciary

Some participants observed that since 2002, the Government had repeatedly declared that it intended to reform the 1991 Constitution, claiming it to be security policy.

<sup>6</sup> “Decreto sobre Zonas de Rehabilitación y Consolidación”, No. 2002 of 2002, 21 September 2002.

inadequate to deal with the economic situation of the country, to maintain public order, and to implement the “Democratic Security Policy”.

Participants stated that the Government attempted to interfere with judicial decisions and to limit the competence and independence of the Constitutional Court, because its rulings were seen as an impediment to the implementation of the Government’s policies. Some participants recalled that, in October 2002, the Government promoted a reform to limit the powers of the Court and the scope of its rulings. The reform aimed at eliminating the Court’s control over the constitutionality of proclamations of state of emergencies, suppressing a constitutional remedy (*acción de tutela*) and replacing the Supreme Council of the Judiciary by a new body composed of representatives of the Executive.

It is significant, participants concluded, that the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional most of the Government’s proposals since 2002, and yet the Government has announced several times that it would present these measures to the Congress again.

### **3 Impact of the “Democratic Security Policy” on human rights**

Many participants expressed concerns about the fact that although the “Democratic Security Policy” was officially presented as a human rights policy, the adoption or implementation of certain measures have resulted in human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, disregard of judicial guarantees, and threats against those who opposed this policy, such as human rights defenders.

The extrajudicial executions carried out by the security forces were an important issue for many speakers, who explained that the security forces usually renamed the executed persons as “guerrilla members killed in combat”, even if they were in fact innocent civilians. Mr. Villalba, representative of the “José Alvear Restrepo” Lawyers Collective, informed the Panel that according to some statistics, there had been more than 5.000 disappearances in Colombia, carried out by the official army and the paramilitaries.

Participants found the systematic practice of mass arbitrary detentions by the State security forces particularly alarming. According to speakers, between August 2002 and August 2004 around 6,300 persons were arbitrarily detained after 77 mass arrests. David Martinez, from Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination, told the Panel that the intensification of the practice was a consequence of the “Democratic Security Policy” and of the Government’s argument that terrorists mix with the civil society and that the fight against terrorism had to involve measures directed against the civilian population. This strategy, he said, led to the generalisation of massive detentions of civilians in order to capture the terrorists. A number of participants expressed concerns about the fact that these arrests were not based on adequate proof but often based on information provided by paid informants to the intelligence service or the judicial police.

Several participants also explained that the Constitutional Court had acknowledged that security forces often abused their authorisation to detain without judicial order under certain conditions, using “administrative captures” even when the requirements were not met.

A former Prosecutor, Orlando Pacheco, told the Panel that in 2003 a group of 128 persons was detained at Montes de María (Department of Sucre), on the basis of an intelligence report and of the testimony of a former guerrilla soldier. Considering that those proofs were not enough to justify such detention, he ordered the release of all these detainees. He explained that this decision led to his suspension from his post and to a judicial investigation against him.

During the public Hearing, the Vice-Minister of Defence insisted that no arbitrary detentions were carried out in Colombia. During the private meetings with the Panel members, State officials also argued that mass arrests might be justified in some situations.

*"In the current framework, the actions of the security forces have been oriented to deactivate the aid that, supposedly the civil population provides to the insurgents. This strategy has led to the generalisation of mass arrests with the aggravating factor that, in many cases, accusations against civilians are made by guerrilla deserters."*

(Oral testimony by Alvaro Echeverri Uriburu, Dean of the School of Law of the University of Santo Tomás, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

*"Between 2002 and 2004, 6590 persons were arbitrarily detained, including leaders, lawyers, peasants, teachers, shopkeepers, workers and displaced people. Besides being imprisoned, their reputation was also ruined, since they were presented as insurgents or terrorists. Once they were released, they suffered harassment from paramilitary and military and, in some cases, they have been assassinated."*

(Oral testimony by Gloria Florez, Alternative Social Promotion Association, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

*"In Colombia, there are no detentions without judicial order. Although massive, all detentions are based on judicial orders and are carried out in the presence of judicial police and public officials such as defenders and prosecutors. When it is alleged that these requirements have not been met, there should be investigations and there will be sanctions with due strength of public authority."*

(Oral testimony by Jorge Eastman, Colombian Vice-Minister of Defence, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

#### **4 Stigmatisation of legitimate dissent and of human rights defenders**

Several participants explained that the "Democratic Security Policy" resulted in the impossibility for the population to stay neutral. The friend-enemy dichotomy ("everyone who is not with us is against us") led to the stigmatisation of those who oppose the Government or defend the rights of those that the Government considers involved in terrorism, such as trade unionists, journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers and representatives of the indigenous population. Representatives of civil society expressed concerns about the fact that the Government

A great number of participants stated that, as a result of this climate of hostility promoted by the Government, the situation of human rights defenders was increasingly deteriorating. Several witnesses told the Panel that human rights defenders were constantly harassed, persecuted and stigmatised by high-level State authorities for denouncing human rights violations and were accused of supporting guerrilla movements or labelled as terrorists. They argued that this defamation campaign by high-level State authorities exposed NGOs and human rights

defenders to further attacks, primarily from the paramilitaries.<sup>7</sup> One participant mentioned data collected by the Colombian Commission of Jurists indicating that between 2002 and 2004, thirty-three human rights defenders had been killed or disappeared. Participants also claimed that the authorities often failed to conduct proper investigations into those incidents.

Some speakers also expressed particular concern for lawyers working on the defence of victims of the conflict. They are often stigmatised by the authorities and experience practical difficulties in conducting their work. For example, they frequently have troubles accessing files and meeting their clients, especially when their clients are held in solitary confinement, even if there is no legal basis for such measures.

*“Denouncing human rights violations committed by the paramilitary groups has implied the designation and stigmatisation as collaborators of the guerrillas.”*

(Oral testimony by Gloria Suárez, Female Popular Organisation, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

*“During 2005, twenty-four legal professionals were killed for carrying out their professional duties. Furthermore, there are practical difficulties in gaining access to detainees, authorities argue that they are held incommunicado when there is no rule authorising it, and they obstruct access to legal files. Additionally, lawyers have been stigmatised when they assume the defense of victims.”*

(Oral testimony by Reinaldo Villalba, “José Alvear Restrepo” Lawyers Collective, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

#### *Impact on trade unionists*

The Panel had the opportunity to listen to the testimony of several trade unionists who expressed serious concern about the repression to which they were subjected. They said that they were victims of threats, harassment, and even killings, particularly from paramilitary groups. Trade unionists told the Panel that the Government considered their cause as a terrorist one, and did not protect them from attacks. Yessid Camacho, from the National Association of Hospital Workers Trade Union, explained that during the last 5 years, 120 members of his trade union had been killed by paramilitary groups in connivance with drug cartels, for opposing the privatisation of health services.

*“On 5 August 2004, three trade-union leaders were extra-judicially executed by the national army. The three of them had been victims of threats, home searches and were the subjects of arrest warrants. Although at the outset they were presented as guerrilla members from the ELN killed in action, later, the Human Rights Bureau of the Office of the Prosecutor confirmed that they were victims of extrajudicial execution by the army.”*

(Oral testimony by Gloria Florez, Alternative Social Promotion Association, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

*“The right to association, provided for in article 39 of the Political Constitution, is nothing but an utopia in our country; not in vain did Julio Roberto Gomez Esguerra, Secretary General of the General Labor Confederation, declare that in our country it is easier to form a guerrilla group than a trade union.”*

<sup>7</sup> See speech of President Uribe in Bogotá, 8 September 2003, available at <http://colombia.indymedia.org/news/2003/09/5644.php> (last accessed on 16 September 2008).

(written submission by William Millán, General Labor Confederation (CGT), original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

### *Impact on the media*

Although the Colombian Constitution of 1991 proscribes media censorship, the Panel heard that the work of the media was being seriously hampered. Participants highlighted that threats and killings of a large number of journalists have caused anxiety among professionals working in the area. Although the Government representative at the Hearing stated that the number of journalist killings had decreased, Hollman Morris, journalist, and other participants said that such decrease was explained by the fact that journalists had opted for self-censorship for the fear of becoming the target of such attacks.

*“Of the total amount of threats against journalists, 99% are still unpunished, which is the reason why a real action from the State is necessary (...) The people carrying out attacks and threats against journalists are diverse. It may be the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, or drug-traffickers. However, during the last few years, journalism has been stigmatised by the Government for offering a platform to human rights defenders, indigenous people, trade unionists, and all those it considers as enemies.”*

(Oral testimony by Hollman Morris, journalist, original in Spanish, translation by the ICJ)

### *Impact on Afro-descendants and indigenous people*

The Panel heard that the long-lasting armed conflict had resulted in the internal displacement of millions of people. Gustavo Gallón, from the Colombian Commission of Jurists, told the Panel that about 3.5 million people were displaced in Colombia, including around one million displaced during the current Administration.

Various community representatives emphasised that Afro-descent and indigenous communities were being particularly affected by the armed conflict, and especially by forced displacements. They said that their communities were under continuous risk of being attacked, because they lived on lands of strategic and economic interest to all armed groups and businesses. They reported that many members of their communities had been subjected to killings, harassment and enforced disappearances, in addition to having been forcibly displaced.

For example, a representative for several Afro-descendent communities told the Panel that inhabitants of the region of Rio Jiguamiando have been accused of belonging to the guerrillas and have been obliged to relocate to other regions from their own lands. Similarly, Marco Velasco, representative of the “Organization Cavida”, explained that in 1997, around 8,000 peasants, most of whom Afro-descendants, were displaced in the region of Cacarica, during a military operation against the guerrilla.

### *Impact on women and children*

The Panel heard from various participants that the internal armed conflict had grave impacts on women and children. The situation was said to be particularly critical for indigenous and Afro-Colombian women. Speakers said that they were subjected to physical, psychological, and sexual violence, but also to discrimination, homicides,

torture, displacements, and other serious human rights violations. Gloria Amparo Suárez, from the Female Popular Organisation, described various cases of violence against women carried out by different parties to the conflict. She gave the example of Esperanza Maíz who was killed by paramilitaries just next to a police station after denouncing threats she had received from them.

## 5 **Information about the Hearing**

### 5.1 **Press Release at the conclusion of the Hearing**

### 5.2 **Participants at the public Hearing**

- Gloria Amparo Suárez, Female Popular Organization;
- Luz Estella Aponte, “Reiniciar” corporation;
- Representative, National Association of Hospital Workers;
- Jorge Mario Eastman, Vice-Minister of Defense of Colombia;
- Alvaro Echeverri Uriburu, Dean, School of Law, University of Santo Tomás;
- María Victoria Fallón, Interdisciplinary Human Rights Group of Medellín;
- Gloria Florez, Alternative Social Promotion Association;
- Gustavo Gallón Giraldo, Director, Colombian Commission of Jurists;
- Representative, Workers’ Trade-Union;
- David Martínez, Colombia – Europe –United States Coordination;
- Representative, Life and Peace Community of Castillo;
- Representative, General Labor Confederation;
- Representative, Colombia’s Workers Center;
- Hollman Morris, Journalist;
- Orlando Pacheco, former Public Prosecutor;
- Representatives, Displaced People’s Organization of “El Salado – Bolívar”;
- Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Center of Studies in Law, Justice and Society;
- Representative, Organization “Cavida”;
- Reinaldo Villalba, José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective;
- Representative, “Kankuamo” indigenous group.

### 5.3 **Government representatives met in private meetings**

- Francisco Santos Calderón, Vice-President of Colombia;
- Manuel José Cepeda, President of the Constitutional Court;
- Mario Iguarán, General Public Prosecutor (*Fiscal General*);
- Edgardo Maya Villazón, Inspector General (*Procurador General*).

### 5.4 **Written submissions**

- Center for Studies in Law, Justice and Society, “Some reflections on anti-terrorism measures in Colombia”;
- Colombian Commission of Jurists (15 submissions);
- Communities of African Descent;
- General Labour Confederation, “Situation of the unions in Colombia”;
- Interdisciplinary Human Rights Group of Medellín, “Impact of the anti-terrorist policies in the municipalities”;
- José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective, “Counter-terrorism measures in Colombia”.